Using military force against an enemy to punish, avenge a wrong, as retribution is a timeless cause of armed conflict. There are many examples throughout history of successful punitive operations. Analyzing historical punitive expeditions for the elements that made them successful or unsuccessful can aid future military and government leaders in framing strategic and operational conflicts, and serve as a backplane for attempting to understand the nature of punitive expeditions and strikes. The purpose of this monograph is to study punitive attack and assess what makes these operations successful or unsuccessful. To do this, we first analyze what punitive operations are, and their place in the causes and reasoning for war. By surveying early international law we can see that attacking to avenge a loss or as retribution is an enduring and justified cause of war. Revenge is a uniquely human emotion, and one that is present even in primitive societies who did not wage war against another tribes. In the United States, one of the earliest scholars who wrote about the laws of war and how they affect punitive doctrine was Francis Lieber. Lieber's Code gives us the idea of military necessity, an important element of punitive operations or actions. Some of the modern concepts of punitive war are found in the early writings on small wars in both the British Army and the United States Army and Marine Corps. In manuals, professional journals, and school instruction one can find the vestiges of a doctrine for punitive operations and expeditions. The historical campaigns of both the British and the United States provide some excellent examples of punitive operations in execution. The twenty year fight by the British army against the Mad Mullah in Somaliland ended with the use of the airplane to finally quell the Mullah's influence. The United States Army under the command of General John Pershing launched a punitive expedition into northern Mexico in search of the bandit Poncho V